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CHAPTER FIVE 




(erin revived interest in Africa has recently become the subject 
of increased global interest. This chapter critically examines the 
bilateral relationship between Ghana and China in the last sixty 
years. The chapter argues that analysis of the sixty years of bilateral 
relationship between Ghana and China offers critical insights into the 
discursive construction and configuration of power relations. Rather than 
pessimistic assertions about the ‘exploitative’ aspects of Ghana-China 
relations, this chapter holds the view that governmentality rationality as 
conceptualised by Michel Foucault articulates a particular form of power 
relations embedded in Ghana-China engagement, particularly regarding 
the agency of Ghanaian elites. 
Drawing on elite consensus theory to buttress my point, this chapter 
contributes to the scholarship on governmentality to examine the 
distinctiveness of the changing dynamic of power relations in Ghana-China 
engagement. My larger argument is that Ghana-China engagement is 
legitimised by a rationality that presents them as equals. Methodologically, 
the chapter draws on secondary literature based on both primary 
documents, namely, Bui Dam and Ghana Gas Project documents, which is 
by far the biggest diplomatic and bilateral agreements between China and 
Ghana. Bui Dam and Ghana Gas Project documents are analysed with an 
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infusion of perspectives from academic literature. 
Elite Consensus and Governmentality 
The increasing presence of China in Africa in recent years has attracted 
the interest and attention of policymakers, academics and researchers 
spawning a vast literature (Hodzi, 2017). A fast-rising China in the last 
three decades has managed to deeply strengthen its influence in Africa. 
Arguably, China is present economically and politically in every part of 
Africa (Wakesa, 2020). The most important element of Chinese influence in 
Africa is in the area of development aid assistance and overseas investment 
which take into account the interest of the marginalised African states in 
international arena (Mohan, 2015).The new policy frameworks of Chinese 
engagement with Africa issued in recent times is captured in FOCAC 
which emphasised equality and mutually beneficial cooperation in 
the realm of common development of Africa and China (Wakesa, 2020; 
Gadzala, 2015). The chapter interrogates elite consensus (i.e. political and 
economic relationships between elite) as the most important political 
process, rather than broader citizen-state relations and development aid 
within the context of Ghana-China relations. Taken to its furthest extent 
in elite theory, and embodied in the various critical political economy 
approaches, elites consensus as its basic determines power structure and 
institutional arrangements and governance that give legitimacy to any 
collective decision making (Azeez & Ibukunoluwa, 2015). Kifordu (2011) 
makes the point that this assumption from a policy viewpoint, materially 
and discursively) underlies the shaping of ideological and philosophical 
directions of societies. Elite consensus derives its legitimacy mainly from 
compliance with national priorities and policies (Ansoms, 2009; Ansoms et 
al., 2014b). During the course of 2000s, elite consensus emerged as a new 
and powerful research agenda (Abegaz, 2013, p. 1470; Behuria, 2015, p.417; 
Meyns & Musamba, 2010). 
This literature has produced a wealth of insights about the changing roles 
and significance of states in governing the global which materially and 
discursively operate in the modern world. The symbiotic relationship 
between Ghanaian political elites and the Chinese has institutionalised 
monopolisation and personalisation of economic and trade engagements. 
Within his schemata, several authors have stressed the importance of 
existing consensus among political elites as the basis of development 
(Behuria, 2015; Huggins, 2014a; Gokgiir, 2012; Ratcliffe, 2013). Huggins 
(2014a) points out that elite consensus provides political and discursive 
support for national development. A relatively long period of autonomy 
from the vested interests of state-centred elites coupled with substantial 
inflows of aid and consistent external support, (notably Ghana) have 
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helped to achieve an evident national growth and development. It is worth 
noting here that the relationship between regime types and elite structures 
in the view of scholars foster political and regime legitimacy (Hodzi, 2017). 
According to John Higley and Michael Burton (2006, p.23.), liberal 
democracy is only possible with a consensually united elite, which 
is increasingly characterised by ‘‘dense and interlocked networks of 
communication and influence”. Since 1992 the pattern of engagements 
between Ghana and China has duly recognised the basic values and 
norms of political behaviour as well as bargaining as an acceptable mode 
of operation. In other words, united elites is closely meshed by structural 
political integration and deep sense of trust (Marat, 2012). Moreover, 
many authors have emphasised how political stability /regime types help 
to build mutual trust (Giddens, 1973; Kreps, 2010). By contrast, unstable 
and competing elite factions ultimately lead to a slow convergence toward 
shared norms of political behaviour. Compromises among elites provide 
the basis for a subsequent broadening of the scope of elite unity. 
Political control notably through governing elites over their own societies 
is a critical element in socio-economic success. The key idea here is 
that interlocked webs of coalitions are a precondition for efficient and 
effective central decision making (Kreps, 2010). Indeed John Higley 
(2006) clarifies that economic development and democratic promise are 
largely based on elite consensus and regime legitimacy. Elite consensus 
of an institutional kind is evident from Ghana in which vigorous attempts 
have been made towards exploiting the geopolitical and geo-economic 
competition between China and the Western countries. Intensified 
competition as a result of transition to multi-party elections has only led to 
elite accommodation which is essential for socio-economic development. 
The elite consensus in Ghana and China can be explained as resulting 
from mutual accommodation, robustness of political society, basic 
institutions and the political compromises upon which they are based. 
The establishment of elite-to-elite relations (new ties with Chinese and 
Ghanaian elites) has led to an immediate change in Ghana's and China’s 
positions in the world-economy. By this I mean Ghana’s new relationship 
with China has structurally restructured the core-periphery relations 
(Flint and Waddoups, 2019). As we will see, elite consensus in Ghana has 
shaped and conditioned Ghana-China bilateral relations (China-Ghana 
bilateral relations is a function of their elites’ cohesion). China’s preference 
for bilateralism and reliance on elite-to-elite relations makes it possible for 
political elites in Ghana to maintain control of both their respective states 
and economies. 
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The chapter accomplishes two broad objectives: first, it challenges the 
alleged assumption that African elites are weak in their relations with China; 
second it presents a case study of China-Ghana relations, particularly as 
they relate to aid and development practices. The conceptual anchor of the 
argument is Ghana-China engagement serves as a useful key in unlocking 
African assertive agency in Sino-African relations. It is also to re-evaluate 
how elite consensus chimes with contemporary mode of governing 
rationality (notably bargaining and patterns of interactions) and to reflect 
upon what can be learned in terms of aid and new development agenda. 
Critical questions examined by the chapter are the following: What can 
we learn from Foucauldian reinterpretation of elite consensus in Ghana- 
China increasing engagement? And what can we learn from Ghana-China 
relations from Foucauldian perspective? Answers to these questions must 
be sought in the analysis of Ghana-China relations, and as to whether 
there is anything to be said about the intricate relationship between state 
authority and autonomy, and economic management which render the 
state capable of performing their functions. Perhaps these answers must 
fundamentally rest on something more than the evidently self-serving 
perceptions of Africanist scholars (Hodzi, 2017) and their sympathisers of 
the “exploitative” aspects of the Ghana-China relations. 
To grasp the processes of elite bargaining and strategic interaction 
associated with Ghana-China relations over the last sixty years and 
the practices and productive power implied in them, I draw upon 
the ““governmentality’’ analytic originally conceptualised by Michel 
Foucault (Foucault, 2010). The analytical power of the governmentality 
framework lies in its ability to highlight processes of governance and 
institutionalisation of political authority and how elite structures are 
increasingly linked to successful economic development between Ghana 
and China. The distinctive nature of governmentality rationality is that it 
offers a powerful impetus to appreciate the intricate relationship between 
Ghana and China: what kind of governmental rationality characterises 
Ghana-China relations. Elite consensus contributes to a governmentality 
rationality in a way which, at the very least, provides a set of attitudes 
towards political authority on staying afloat rather than getting anywhere 
(Bayart, 1993). Governmentality rationality ascribes respect for political 
authority, sound government policies and interpersonal trust. It therefore 
allows the state to implement policies effectively since the process of 
implementation itself is discursively mediated; and makes it all the more 
necessary to have political autonomy. This chapter provides a particular 
contribution to the debate in its application of Foucauldian insights with 
regards to the disciplinary power of Chinese aid and its application to 
outcomes in Ghana-Chinese relations. Further, it provides an important 
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contribution to the burgeoning literature on the broader implications of 
China in Africa and specifically on Ghana-China relations. 
SINO-GHANA BLLATERAL RELATIONS IN 
HISTORICAL CONTEXTS 
In this section I explore the historical contours and contexts of contemporary 
Ghana-China bilateral relations. China’s role in Ghana as a financier of 
large-scale investment programmes has received considerable attention in 
recent times. There is a long history between Ghana and People’s Republic 
of China (hereafter China). Close Sino-Ghana interaction can be traced 
from the 1960s when the countries first established diplomatic relations 
under Chairman Mao Zedong and Ghana’s first president Dr. Kwame 
Nkrumah (Chau, 2014; Odoom, 2017). Indeed chairman Mao Zedong and 
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana laid a solid foundation for the development 
of the bilateral ties (Qdoom, 2017). Since then, relations between the two 
countries have been deepened by strong personal relationships between 
the political elites of the two countries. Until the overthrow of Dr. Kwame 
Nkrumah, China was a strategic ally of Ghana. Despite the ideological 
commonalities between Ghana and China (common interest in the struggle 
against colonialism and imperialism), relations between the two countries 
were not mainly based on ideology: what bounded them together in those 
years were at the level of investments and trade. 
After the overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, there was a lull in the 
foreign/ diplomatic relations between China and Ghana (Odoom, 2017). 
Over the last decade and half Ghana has provided critical diplomatic 
support to China, while China has reciprocated with substantial 
material support for development. It is important to state that China’s 
contemporary engagement with Ghana began with its support for the 
Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) regime during the tenure 
of Jerry Rawlings as Ghana’s Head of State. The government of China 
provided largely unconditional support to the PNDC regime especially 
in the mid-1980s. In the period of 1960 to the late-1990s China became 
one of the major development partners of Ghana. Under the framework 
of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum there have been various bilateral 
diplomatic relations between Ghana and China. In promoting and 
strengthening the development cooperation between the two countries, 
China has provided development assistance within its capacity mainly in 
the form of grants, loans and technical assistance. Further, China-Ghana 
cooperation on economy and bilateral trade have increased significantly 
over the years. China’s investment pouring into Ghana in the last decades 
is quite instructive. For example, bilateral trade volume has increased to 
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US$66.4 billion while a number of newly registered Chinese investment 
projects topped Ghana’s Foreign Direct Investment list in 2016 (Dibie, 
2017; Odoom, 2017). The Chinese government has engaged in exchanges 
and cooperation with Ghana in the fields of culture, education, medical 
health, trade, infrastructure and telecommunications. Historical ties 
between Ghana and China have strengthened and deepened in the years 
since 1960 and this has given China a fair understanding of local dynamics 
in Ghana (Aidoo, 2010; Amoah, 2018). Beijing has taken keen interest in 
giving financial assistance to Ghana which comprised almost a quarter of 
the Chinese aid programme by the 1980s (Zeitz, 2015). 
China-Ghana interactions have undergone different development phases. 
To be clear Africa-China cooperation agreements was revitalised through 
the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) established in 2000 
(Amoah, 2018a; Gadzala, 2015). The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC), is the centrepiece of China’s strategy towards Africa (Wakesa, 
2020). Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has been an important 
platform of collective dialogue between Africa and China (Amoah, 2018b). 
The Beijing Summit and the Seventh Ministerial Conference of the Forum 
on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held on 3-4 September 2018 have 
served as the basis for deeper and broader cooperation between Ghana 
and China (Amoah, 2018a). In the spirit of China’s Africa policy of 2006 
and 2015, there have also been political exchanges between members 
of Ghana’s Parliament and officials of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). China’s intensifying engagement with 
Ghana has at least three critical pillars: namely, strategic and diplomatic 
relations, economic relations and social and cultural relations (Jiang & 
Jing, 2010; Mohan & Lampert, 2013; Rupp, 2013). The difference between 
this relationship and China’s other bilateral relations lie in the internal 
balance of these pillars and this is not unique to Ghana, per se. In this 
context, cooperation between Ghana and China emerges from the political 
elites or representatives from both administration (For me, this type of 
collaboration or engagement guarantees the most benefits in terms of 
economic and political development, and involves active initiatives by 
state elites at different institutional levels [Zhao, 2014)). 
Ghanaian elites have developed personal relationships with Chinese 
officials especially during the era of Nkrumah and Premier Zhou Enlai, 
and by high-level official visits, including several visits by Ghana’s 
former president John Kufuor to China in 2002 and China’s President Hu 
to Ghana in 2003 (Amoah, 2014b). It is significant to note that although 
Sino-Ghana cooperation has led to more personal relationships, these 
connections are borne out of and revolve around economic and political 
interests. China’s development assistance packages to Ghana have been in 
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the form of technical support; grants; and interest-free, interest-subsidised 
and concessionary loans (buyers’ and suppliers’ credit) (Moyo, 2016; 
Lam, 2017). In recent times, China has become a major bilateral source 
of infrastructure investment in Ghana focusing its assistance especially 
on the development of roads, energy and telecommunications, sewage 
systems, bridges, and on technical cooperation (Rupp, 2013; Odoom, 2017). 
Most of Ghana’s funded infrastructure projects are executed by Chinese 
construction firms, like China Railways and Sinohydro. A careful reading 
of Ghana-China bilateral framework in my view depicts a picture of equal 
partners thus far. 
GOVERNMENTALITY, AID, AND 
DEVELOPMENTAL PRACTICES 
In this section I mobilize Michel Foucault’s insights to understand 
the unfolding Ghana-China relationship. My analytical framework 
discursively frames the ‘freedom’ and ‘agency’ of Ghanaian elites in 
its relations with the Chinese. It particularly seeks to highlight a more 
productive, empowering and constitutive analysis of power as opposed 
to a visibly repressive and centrally originated form of power. Foucault's 
work, on governing rationalities enables us to highlight how Ghana-China 
relations fundamentally inverts classical or traditional IR framings of 
‘agency’ and ‘freedom’. Michel Foucault’s (1926-1984) seminal lectures on 
the history of governmentality delivered at the College de France have 
influenced a generation of the highly credentialed scholars (Foucault, 
2008). Governmentality, for Foucault, meant “the conduct of conduct” 
or government of others working through their autonomy rather than 
through domination (Foucault, 2010). My central preoccupation with 
governmentalities— or, more accurately the of arts of government is to 
show just how Foucault's analysis of manifestations of power relations 
work through autonomous “free” individuals and the processes of 
subjectification this involves rather than techniques of domination and 
subjugation (Foucault, 2004). Far from being a technique of domination, 
governmentality framework represents a differing modality of power that 
attempts to discursively facilitate and legitimise external interventions. This 
chapter seeks to canvas the view that contemporary aid and development 
practices are a carefully constructed rationality of governing through 
which donors seek to transform recipient countries as self-disciplined 
subjects. 
Governmentality as patented by Foucault can refer to techniques and 
technologies deliberately employed, on the one hand, to govern subjects 
either directly or indirectly by structuring the field of possibilities, and 
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on the other, the configuration of subjectivity itself under the action of 
government (Foucault, 2004). Rose (2000, p.27) notes this arguing that, “to 
govern, one could say, is to be condemned to seek an authority for one’s 
authority”. His work on practices of disciplinary mechanisms, coupled 
with an exploration of technologies of normalisation, and stressing their 
interaction with discourse of “ governmentality”’ enable us to analyse the 
intimate symbiosis between disciplinary discourses in the framework of aid 
and development practices. In this respect aid and development practices 
seek to mobilise idealised schemata of “social reality” to produce states and 
governments which construct themselves through their own autonomy, 
self-governance and self-subjectification or shape their own conduct 
through what Foucault calls the “technologies of the self” (2007, p.18); one 
in which states and governments voluntarily embrace particular economic 
choices. Such a reflection may help to destabilise and disrupt the paralysing 
idea of forms of domination; one in which the Chinese government imposes 
their priorities on poor Ghanaian people in order to analyse the subtle 
yet insidious ways in which power is exercised and rationalised through 
practices of freedom (Death, 2011, p.3). Governmentality perspective 
relocates freedom and agency within the realm of development practices 
and in so doing transcends the simplistic and simplifying understanding 
of Ghana-China relations in terms of typical hegemonic top-down model ; 
hierarchical and monolithic imperative. 
For one thing ‘Africa’ is not a singular entity, and an outcome of these 
homogenising approaches is that African voices are silenced, which repeats 
the age-old assumption that African states lack meaningful agency, and 
so have to be spoken for. African elites in reality, have lots of agential 
capacity in dealing with the supposedly ‘strong’ Chinese. Within this 
configuration, African elites engagement with the Chinese, it can be argued, 
is instrumentalised to promote specific techniques of government as well 
as cooperation based on the desire for greater autonomy and freedom. 
I will argue that this framing is of vital importance to understand the 
discourse of African agency in relation to the imperatives of development 
and economic self-interest. 
Governmentality, Foucault maintains, “retains and utilizes the techniques, 
rationalities and institutions characteristic of both sovereignty and 
discipline’ but seek to rework and “recode” them (Dean, 1999, p.29). 
I would add that Africa is characteristic in that regard in that it works 
through the shaping of state institutions and the re-conceptualisation of 
national policies. Since the last decade and half Afro-Chinese interactions 
have increasingly been marked by techniques of cooperation, inclusion 
and consensual mentality of government. One clarification is needed. 
According to Dean (1999), Foucault did not really offer a theory of agency, 
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at least, not in any direct and unproblematised sense. Foucault tried to 
rebuff such accusations clarifying that in his view, his work appeared to 
have an “‘irritant’’ effect (Foucault, 2007, p.257). Therefore, for Foucault, 
power relations are primarily based on freedom, to the extent that ‘’the 
“other” (the one over whom power is exercised) must be recognized and 
maintained to the very end as a subject who acts” (Foucault, 2010, p.10). 
This means that without the freedom and autonomy of the individual, 
contemporary governmentality as a mechanism of rule is unthinkable. In 
other words, processes of agency and autonomy increasingly characterise 
governmentality analytic: ‘‘to govern humans is not to crush their capacity 
to act, but to acknowledge it and to utilize it for one’s own objective” 
(Rose & Miller, 2010, p.12). Foucault's own work, I will argue, evinces a 
recognition for co-operation rather than domination. In the light of this 
view, we can invoke Foucault to talk about Ghana-China relations. Indeed 
the whole discussion of the Ghana-China relations needs to be set in the 
analysis of Foucauldian governmentality in which Ghana’s position has 
been one of proactive and free agent. The advantage of such an account 
is that it provides a productive interrogative horizon to an understanding 
of a broader range of techniques and technologies more concretely 
rearticulated to historically altering complex governmental rationalities. 
Foucault's richly nuanced conceptualisation of governmentality enables 
us to situate subjectivities, rationalities and techniques particularly as it 
coexists with the disciplinary rationale of power, and extend that to Ghana- 
China relations. The analysis of the intricacies of the following two case 
studies (the Bui Dam and the Ghana Gas infrastructure Project) highlights 
the critical agency of Ghanaian elites within the framework of China’s 
actions, strategies and activities to influence outcomes to their advantage. 
THE BEIJING CONSENSUS 
Here I deploy Beijing Consensus heuristically to draw out the distinctive 
characteristics of China-Ghana very close friendship within the context 
of governmentality framework. In broad terms, China’s development 
model-Beijing Consensus constitutes an alternative policy mix which is 
based on intensive intervention of government (Breslin, 2018; Galchu, 
2018). ‘Beijing Consensus’ is essentially a contested concept. Arguably, 
there is no consensus on the Beijing Consensus to the extent that its 
boundaries are perceptive and not seen to be used by Chinese elites 
evokes and produces flexible and differentiated understanding by its 
users (Rebol, 2010). There has been a lot of academic and policy discussion 
over the “Beijing Consensus’ espoused by the Chinese elites which posit 
a more peaceful co-existence in their engagements across Africa. While 
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some of them consider the ‘Beijing Consensus’ a suitable replacement of 
the “Washington Consensus” (Chen, 2017), others question the viability of 
the Chinese model as an alternative approach to development (Hlaing & 
dan Kakinaka, 2018). ‘Beijing Consensus’ as a new model of development 
deviates/departs from neoliberal tendencies of the “Washington 
Consensus” in that it comes without the restrictive conditions and 
bureaucracy of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors. 
Hence, ‘Beijing Consensus’ development model marks a dramatic shift 
not only in the institutional structure of development assistance but also 
in the practices of development (Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 2019). While the 
Washington Consensus recommends a one- size- fits all approach to nearly 
all developing countries, Beijing Consensus stresses the necessity for a 
new approach to development based on each nation’s unique challenges 
(Ramo, 2004, p. 5). 
In particular, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ frames China’s alternative economic 
development approach—especially for developing countries—to the 
so-called ‘Washington Consensus” of neoliberal development policies 
incarnated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
Therefore, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ reflects an alternative development 
approach based on the principle of non-interference in domestic politics 
and self-determination (Ramo, 2004; Reinhart, 2018b; Brautigam, 2011). 
The institutional framework of ‘Beijing Consensus’ has become the 
focus for much of the policy dialogue as well as negotiations on official 
development financing between China and her development partners, not 
least Ghana. ‘Beijing Consensus’ is primarily a document outlining China’s 
national economic policy with a focus on representation, consultation 
and engagement on participatory policy making (Galchu, 2018). It places 
emphasis on China’s integrated aid strategy and scheme of financing. 
Equally, the “Beijing Consensus’ framework serves as a prerequisite for 
grant financing and lending from the Chinese government. It is formulated 
in a participatory manner and nationally owned, meaning the involvement 
of the government of the country it purports to serve and for whom these 
policies are directed. The ‘Beijing Consensus’ framework is prescriptive 
but not mandatory template for strategic policy making. In other words, 
the conceptual principles and operational directives underpinning the 
‘Beijing consensus’ involve common prioritisation of policy dialogue and 
development of political institutional framework (Ramo, 2004; Kennedy, 
2010). Furthermore, the rules and the policy design of the Beijing Consensus 
development model are primarily rooted in the “international” than in 
the “‘national’’. Its focus has consistently centred upon the underlying 
policy design of national economic strategies. The Beijing Consensus 
model does not seek the rolling-back of the post-colonial African states 
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which underpinned the modalities of Western development strategies 
based on free market theology and democracy. Rather it reconstructs and 
reconstitutes the state through participatory process and by rehabilitating 
the regulatory capacity of the state. The core of the Beijing Consensus 
development model thus reflects an effort to resolve economic problem 
rather than manage it (Zhao, 2014). 
THE POWER OF GHANA’S ELITES 
In international development it is claimed that the place of African political 
elites has been marginal and peripheral in its engagement with China 
(Moyo, 2016; Mohan, 2015; Chipaike & Henri Bischoff, 2018). However 
in the following I show that Ghanaian elites assert agency and broker 
dialogical relations with their Chinese counterparts and therefore should 
not be underestimated. It is my contention that Ghanaian elites are an 
unabashedly autonomous constituency whose engagements are defined 
by commonalties of strategic interests with their counterparts in the global 
arena. Indeed the economic aid offered by the Chinese are based on the 
established principle of non-interference that gives Ghanaian elites more 
freedom and autonomy to define its policy priorities and alternatives. 
The principle of non-interference is enshrined in the Beijing Consensus 
(Galchu, 2018). To that extent Ghanaian elites arguably have significant 
bargaining power and insert meaningful agency when engaging with their 
Chinese counterparts. Ghanaian elites have used their strategic resource 
endowments to exert control by making amendments and observations 
before the signature of contract engagement. Ghanaian elites have been 
the strongest in its engagement with China when it comes to negotiation. 
Several rounds of negotiation between Ghanaian elites and Chinese 
officials for instance, led to the imposition of several clauses which 
includes acquiring local material construction, respect of the national 
laws in regard to salaries, work accidents, social security and employment 
and in hiring local workers (Mohan, 2015). My view is that the options 
Ghanaian elites adopt are not merely crude impositions, but the result of 
negotiations and horse trading geared toward enhancing their agency. 
Ghanaian president Mr Akuffo-Addo, even at the risk of damaging the 
development of bilateral exchanges and co-operation, or losing the favour 
of the Chinese government reminded the Chinese to respect the laws of 
Ghana just as they do theirs (Flick, 2017). 
This remark by President Mr Akufo-Addo is equally telling in that it reflects 
how Ghanaian elites do not pander to the whims and caprices of China in 
their various aid agreements. It also provides an intake in understanding 
the relative autonomy of Ghanaian elites. In this understanding, states 
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governing elites are understood to be socially embedded within institutional 
frameworks — which is increasingly seen to be the sphere for governance 
interventions in aid and development practices. This chapter makes the 
point that Ghanaian elites have assumed a type of political subjectivity 
and critical agency that affirm their sense of self around the practices 
and imperatives of aid and development practices. Confirming this 
assertiveness shown by Ghana, a Ghanaian official and former Minister of 
Energy under the government of John Kufuor, Mr Ken Dapaah, reportedly 
stated that Ghana-China friendship and cooperation is based on the spirit 
of co-development (Habia, 2009). In fact, former Ghanaian president John 
Agyekum Kufour prior to the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China- 
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2006 provides a poignant reflection on 
Ghana and China friendship over the years as a win-win to development 
cooperation and reciprocity. ““we will talk openly and frankly to each 
other, with a view to explore better chances of getting benefits both on 
the African side as well as for the Chinese side’’(Xinhua News Agency, 
2006). Political elites as active partners, proactive and capable agents in 
the formulation and implementation of development policy in the main 
is reflected in the dynamics of Ghana-China increasing bilateral relations. 
The real issue is that such an agency typically questions what have 
characterised conventional IR scholarship over the years and reveals 
major rifts in approaches to development cooperation and assistance in 
the context of Sino-African relations. There can be no doubt that Ghanaian 
elites play a central role both where agenda-setting and decision shaping 
are concerned in its relations with the Chinese. In this regard my analytical 
perspective challenges the predominant view that China has become more 
powerful at the expense of the poor African states. Ghana-China bilateral 
relations at least, theoretically suggests that there is transformation in 
governmental rationality implied in the increased emphasis on governing 
through free and capable agents. Ghanaian elites have always been 
fiercely protective of its sovereignty by leveraging its engagement with 
China which opens policy space for alternatives. I want to suggest that 
Ghanaian elites are agential decision-makers: they are constituted as active 
and capable subjects through contemporary development practices in 
their relations with Chinese counterparts to the extent that they have not 
allowed themselves to be trampled upon or their untoward wishes and 
demands to hold too much sway in the economy which challenges the 
prevailing view about China is exploiting Africa. It is in this light that the 
Ghana-China engagement requires further investigation. 
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THE BUI HYDROELECTRIC DAM PROJECT 
Let me illustrate China-Ghana increasing interaction with particular 
reference to the Bui Hydroelectric Dam project construction in Ghana by 
Sinohydro (Chinese Company) with financing coming from the Chinese 
government through the China Export and Import Bank (Exim Bank) to 
demonstrate the agency of Ghanaian elites within Chinese development 
assistance and cooperation. The case of the Bui Dam project is important 
in the sense that when Ghana’s development partners refused to commit 
themselves, it was the Chinese that executed the project, at a much lower 
cost (Obour et al., 2016). Ghana like most African countries faces significant 
development constraints in its energy sector. The Bui Hydroelectric Dam 
project construction had profound consequences for Ghana in terms of its 
ability to absorb large investment for economic growth and job creation; and 
to fillits infrastructure development gap. Undoubtedly the most significant 
Chinese engagement with Ghana has been the Bui Hydroelectric Dam 
(Chipaike & Henri Bischoff, 2018; Hensengerth, 2013). The Bui Dam project 
located on the Black Volta River at the border of Bole (Northern Region) 
and Bamda (Brong-Ahafo region) districts in the North-western Ghana is 
the largest Chinese investment in Ghana and the largest foreign investment 
in Ghana since the construction of the Atuabo Gas Project (Odoom, 2017; 
Akorsu et al., 2010). The Sinohydro agreement between Ghana and China 
was aimed at accelerating infrastructural development in Ghana (World 
Bank, 2008, p. 108). The construction of Bui hydroelectric Dam Project 
required huge amounts of social and infrastructural investment and so 
external financing was actively sought (Adisu et al., 2010; Bosshard, 2011; 
Odoom, 2017; Chipaike and Henri Bischoff, 2018). China’s Construction 
Bank, the China Export and Import Bank financed the project through 
a concessional loan of $270m, a commercial loan of $292m, and $60m in 
funding from the Government of Ghana (Asante, 2014; Chipaike & Henri 
Bischoff, 2018; Foster & Pushak, 2011). Additionally, the two loans were 
offered with a grace period of five years and an amortisation period of 
20 years. Bui Dam project finance was guaranteed through export sales 
of cocoa beans (Chipaike & Henri Bischoff, 2018). Overall, the Bui Power 
project is strategic for boosting socio-economic development at the local 
and national levels (Hensengerth, 2017; Obour et al., 2016). Even though 
the China Export and Import Bank provided funding for the project, Bui 
Power Authority (BPA) as the public body was solely responsible for the 
supervision of the construction and for managing the performance of the 
main contractor, Sinohydro Corporation Limited (Otoo et al., 2013; Cooke 
et al., 2015). Strikingly, Sinohydro Corporation limited built the Dam but 
the project is owned by Bui Power Authority. 
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The Chinese approach to development assistance and economic 
cooperation enable Ghanaian elites to exercise agency in ways that 
transform hegemonic assumptions about the rationalities of free and 
autonomous subjects. In the sense of Foucauldian agency, the Bui Power 
Authority is an agent who acts to maintain its autonomy and redefine 
legitimacy. In this regard Ghanaian elites degree of control enables them to 
protect their own strategic interests even in dealing with powerful actors 
such as the Chinese. For instance, the Chinese loan terms were considered 
favourable for the Ghanaians. While China Exim Bank initially requested 
a payback period of 17 years, the Ghanaians succeeded in extending the 
time to 20 years (BPA, 2013). According to the Bui Power Authority, loan 
agreements of the Bui Hydroelectric Project were approved and signed 
following the completion of feasibility study and the Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) study containing norms, standards 
and procedures with which the contractor- Sinohydro-had to comply 
in its execution (Hensengerth, 2017). Ghanaian elites made it explicitly 
clear that the ESIAs must be conducted and conform with Ghana’s 
environmental legislation before loan agreements can be signed (ERM, 
2007a). Specifically, Ghanaian elites directed and mandated Sinohydro to 
strictly comply with international best practice and procedures to ensure 
that environmental norms and human rights were not excessively affected 
by the project (BPA, 2018). Environmental and Social Impact Assessment 
required Sinohydro to adhere to a Construction Management Plan that 
would avoid negative consequences for local livelihoods (Management, 
Environmental Resources, 2006). 
It must be noted that Sinohydro Corporation Limited was subjected to and 
made to adhere to a dense network of government planning procedures 
even though the Bui Hydroelectric Project was constructed and financed by 
China (Bosshard, 2011). Another area in which Ghanaian agency is evident 
is with regard to labour and union laws, the use of local materials and local 
employees which is a measure of freedom. Typically, Chinese corporations 
do not encourage labour and union laws however, the Government of 
Ghana made sure this was enshrined in the Bui Hydroelectric Project 
contract (BPA, 2018). Ghanaian elites exerted agency in a manner that 
allowed them to ensure that labour laws, the use of local materials and 
local employees are enforced and effectively elaborated (Chipaike & Henri 
Bischoff, 2018; Obour et al., 2016 ). This therefore profoundly underscores 
how Ghanaian elites exert power over negotiations process with their 
Chinese counterparts in accordance to their local regulations. It needs to be 
emphasised that respect of local standards, laying out of procedures, legal 
requirements indicate a major shift in the power balance in Sino-Ghanaian 
relationship and Africa as a whole. 
128 SIXTY YEARS OF GHANA-CHINA RELATIONS 
FRIENDSHIP, FRICTION, AND THE FUTURE
Looking specifically at the case of Bui Hydroelectric project, Ghanaian 
elites were defined as responsible and, much more importantly, choice- 
making actors that perform vitally important governmental tasks by virtue 
of being defined as subjects of development. My contention is that any 
analytical perspective that only considers how the Chinese government 
controls and challenges the central role of African state actors misses a 
serious fundamental point. I hold the view that increasing interactions 
between China and Ghana essentially is derived from a much more political 
rationality of rule. The argument, by extension, is that within China-Ghana 
relations, political elites are interpellated as autonomous political subjects 
with a capacity for political will-formation. For me, the case of the Bui 
Hydroelectric project in many ways exemplifies how domestic governance 
space and institutional framework invariably determine the nature and 
scope of the involvement of state governing elites. The obvious reality 
here is that Chinese development practices and economic cooperation 
programmes are increasingly intricately embedded in a growing mutual 
political and economic ties. 
In an important twist to the dominant narrative around Chinese 
firms importing their own labour, in the case of Sinohydro project, the 
majority of the workforce were Ghanaians (ERM, 2007b). Insistence on 
the employment of local workers reflects the fact that Ghanaian elites 
are not weak and docile but able to have an important influence over the 
supposedly ‘strong’ Chinese in the form of their local workers. As this 
case study amply demonstrates, Ghanaian elites were enrolled as actors 
rather than being acted on, in performing governance functions. It offers 
an enlightening critical account of how Ghanaian elites have increasingly 
carved out enormous autonomy and agency for their own advancement 
from generous Chinese aid and development (Grugel et al., 2008; Ramo, 
2004). In my view, the case of Sinohydro project illustrates not only how 
Ghanaian elites exercise significant policy autonomy but also how they 
are able to enact agency as Foucault's work on the circulation of power 
indicates (Foucault, 2008). It can reasonably be argued that the ways in 
which the Ghanaian elites and their Chinese counterparts interacted and 
related to each other during the construction of the Bui Hydroelectric 
project is indicative of a radical shift whereby state elites are defined as 
both objects and subjects of government in the processes of governing. 
  
SIXTY YEARS OF GHANA-CHINA RELATIONS 129 
FRIENDSHIP, FRICTION, AND THE FUTURE
THE GHANA GAS INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROJECT 
The Gas infrastructure project of the government of Ghana was constructed 
at Atuabo in the Western Region following Ghana's discovery of oil in 
commercial quantities in 2007(Odoom, 2017). Ghana was in need of access 
to energy resources to fuel its own development. It was in this context 
that the Gas project was built. Ghana Gas Infrastructure Project is the state 
agency that has the mandate to ensure rapid industrialisation in Ghana. 
From this perspective, the Chinese-built gas processing entity was a critical 
piece of infrastructure to aid the country’s economic transformation. The 
$750 million Chinese-built gas project was constructed by the Chinese 
state owned enterprise Sinopec International Petroleum Corporation, 
China’s largest oil refiner, and funded by the Chinese Development 
Bank (Odoom, 2017; Ghana Gas Company, 2013). Indeed the Ghana Gas 
Project brought some temporary relief to the energy shortage in Ghana. 
With regard to Sinopec International Petroleum Corporation contract 
institutional arrangements were put in place to ensure Ghanaians took 
over its full management and technical operations (Ghana Gas Company, 
2013). Ghanaian engineers for instance, took over technical operations 
of the natural gas processing plant and consequently, dispensed with 
the services of expatriate engineers and Sinopec which are themselves 
constitutive of autonomy. This doubtlessly points to the institutionally 
embedded equalities at the level of locally produced liberal rationalities 
which becomes the starting point, the means and the end point for 
understanding the problematic of intervention and of policy responsibility. 
It is instructive to note that the indigenisation of Ghana Gas Infrastructure 
Project operations saved the company some $24 million annually in 
operational and management consultancy services rendered by Sinopec 
International Petroleum Corporation. The funding for Ghana Gas 
Infrastructure Project was collateralised by oil from the Jubilee field (Ghana 
Gas Company, 2013). The government of Ghana called for a renegotiation 
of the contract agreement and demanded the scrapping of its commitment 
fee, which was viewed as outrageously excessive in the light of the 
slow actual disbursement of Chinese funds (Odoom, 2017). Ghanaian 
elites ensured that the proper structures are in place before negotiating 
contracts that will result in a win-win outcome with the Chinese. In this 
way, Ghanaian elites were central in shaping official Chinese policy and 
development practices in the strategic interest of Ghana. This suggests that 
the government of Ghana was an important decision shaper where Ghana 
Gas project was concerned even though the Gas project was constructed 
and financed by the Chinese (BPA, 2013). Ghana-China engagement more 
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broadly highlights the ways in which policy interventions are more locally 
driven under local leadership: formed less hierarchically and based upon 
its contextual preferences and strategic interests. It also means Ghanaian 
elites use their agency to reform or guide policy intervention in the 
cause of development to shape the needs, social-economic and political 
frameworks with regard to the emancipatory potential of this shift 
(Chipaike & Henri Bischoff, 2018). And this this is particularly evident in 
the Ghana Gas Project. Of course, rather than the 1990s frameworks of 
liberal internationalism, Ghana-China engagement focuses on the “bottom 
up” understandings of the importance of local agency, which maintain 
governmentality and the existing dynamics, structures and rationalities of 
power (Springer, 2016). Significantly, using Foucauldian governmentality 
rationalities we can identify ways in which Ghana-China model of 
friendship rebalances the power asymmetries inherent in apparatus of aid 
and development practices (Foucault, 2010). Put somewhat differently, 
the Ghana-China model of friendship is constructed in favour of the 
existing elites local balances of power. This chapter asserts that Ghana- 
China model of friendship radically heralds flatter ontologies of power 
with the emphasis on the increasing agency of the most marginalised and 
peripheralised. Ghanaian elites in the case of the Gas infrastructure project 
was enrolled not only as an objects, but also as a subjects of government, 
heavily involved in every step of the project.This has implications for 
governmentality rationalities concern with the indirect administration 
of the population through processes of subjectification-the creation of 
particular types of subjects-the discursive constitution of a specific form 
of political subjects, as in the increasing Ghana-China relations. That is, 
autonomous self-regulating agents (Ghanaian elites) that are governable — 
which by no means can be described as “technologies of the self” (Foucault, 
2010) embedded within a broader conceptual framework of aid and 
development practices. 
These discursive power dynamics, in my view, can be expanded to the 
intricacies of Ghana-China relations. Ghana-China relations mirrors and 
provides a fascinating view of the sheer transformative and the productive 
power of development discursive practices which precisely lie in the 
processes of subjectification without recourse to domination and control. 
In this way, Foucault’s approach to the analysis of constitution of subject 
formations provide the possibility, an escape route and the means of 
identifying how suitable subjects are produced and constructed (Foucault, 
2008). 
By following Foucault in seeing power as deeply imbricated and 
contained within each other in the production of subjectivity and its 
discursive nature, it has moved away from the fetishisation of aid and 
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development practices as an unproblematic instrumental concept simply 
obscured to entrench existing power relationships. In this conception, 
China-Ghana relations inaugurates and indicates a new era in which 
there is a far broader range of critical agency of the subject with the 
determination to improve its possibilities: and, indeed, it challenges the 
existing conceptualisation of African states actors as passive. To that 
extent, Foucault’s work on governmentality analytic has to be seen as 
indicative of the success of subjects to exercise agency in terms of social 
relations and institutional reconfigurations. Governmentality rationalities 
thus offer an understanding of how population is self-governing and the 
way that subtle circulations of power produce forms of multi-layered and 
polyarchic networks (Foucault, 2008). 
Foucauldian governmentality reasoning is also visible in the reshaping 
of a dominant framework for understanding governance practices most 
notably through the discourse of “localism” and participatory politics with 
significant degree of policy freedom for achieving economic development 
(Lam, 2017). From this perspective, ‘Beijing Consensus’ leads the way in 
the advocacy of “localism” over the liberal one-size-fits-all policies of the 
World Bank and the IMF in economic policy-making. In the case of Ghana, 
this is particularly evident in capacity enhancement model with a great 
deal of emphasis on grassroots empowerment in engagement with the 
Chinese counterparts. Chinese grassroots empowerment is achieved by 
consulting and actively involving the communities to be affected during 
the planning and implementation phases of projects (Lam, 2017) in order 
to ensure that community needs are addressed. This approach provides 
a rationale which is in sharp contrast to the paradoxical straightjacketing 
of Western style model which has been of a top-down, hierarchical ideal 
that reject any Indigenous participation within the radius of development 
(Rotberg, 2008; Grimm, et al., 2011). 
Under the Chinese-style localism approach to economic growth and 
development, local communities are not directly managed and controlled, 
but rather become object of development aid programmes (Hensengerth, 
2013; Ramo, 2004). Importantly, the emphasis on localism enables 
Ghanaian elites to identify the policies and solutions most responsive 
to the needs of its people. For instance, during construction, Sinohydro 
employed 3000 Ghanaian unskilled and semi-skilled workers: operation 
and maintenance was carried out solely by Ghanaian staff (Kirchherr et 
al., 2016). Chinese-style localism inheres in the fact of local institution- 
building specifically around engagement with local communities. 
Besides, local institution-building creates mechanisms for community 
engagement, which involves for example, pre-resettlement consultation 
with the construction contractor Sinohydro (Miine, 2014). Linked to this 
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is China’s focus on local meetings, compensation, resettlement schemes, 
relocation of people who live within and around the proposed dam sites 
and monetary compensation which are vitally important as they allow for 
development of alternative livelihoods and needs (ERM, 2007a). Unlike the 
Akosombo and Kpong projects experiences in Ghana, the intervention by 
Ghanaian elites in the case of China ensured remarkable improvement in 
the housing compensation scheme for the Bui Dam project (BPA, 2011). In 
many senses, Chinese style localism approach supports living standards, 
provide services and infrastructure and social and cultural values of the 
local people (Obour et al., 2016).Chinese actors made public consultation 
with local communities a key component in the design of Bui Dam project 
creating room for engaging the Chinese. The Bui Dam case shows that 
Sinohydro followed Construction Management Plan laid out in the ESIA to 
avoid harming local communities. This local institution-building ensures 
the exercise of power and freedom of local the population which has the 
capacity of creating more inclusive development. 
Chinese aid and economic cooperation programmes inject a measure 
of mutual accountability (downward rather upward accountability), 
a marked departure from the opaque and hierarchical decision making 
of the West. Or, put another way, a decisive move towards the axioms 
of what some have called more inclusive development framework. This 
deliberate policy of “local development” enables a more inclusive or 
distributive understandings (frameworks) for social and economic policy- 
making (Lam, 2017).This in many respects signifies a wider conceptual 
shift in development policy and practice allegedly ignored by liberal 
rationalist approaches. The prioritisation of country-owned development 
framework in the Chinese engagement with Ghana primarily engenders 
a broad-based participatory and emancipatory policymaking process as 
opposed to the gatekeeping function of the Bretton Woods institutions. 
The point I am making largely is that the Chinese inclusive and 
partnership development model represents a marked shift itself as a 
tool of discursive parameters of the market-oriented economic policies 
of neoliberalism. But, and perhaps more importantly is the fact that 
Chinese aid and development practices are materially inscribed in a 
particular regime of macro-technologies of power and the concomitant 
constitution of subjectivities. This conceivably demonstrates the power 
enjoyed by the Ghanaian elites. Crucially, China~-Ghana engagement is 
neither of coercion or technologies of domination but rather China prefers 
bilateral aid patterns while offering a ‘no strings’, no conditionality, 
non-interference, win-win and constructive approach in infrastructure 
development investment (Mohan, 2015) against the free-wheeling policies 
of the globalised discredited ‘“Washington Consensus”. While China’s 
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increasing presence in Africa is enthusiastically welcomed, the established 
policy of Chinese non-conditionality and non-interference in contrast to 
the West's coercive approach has been challenged over the years with 
some intellectuals claiming that the current Sino-African engagement 
undermines long term African development agenda. The prevailing 
criticism is that China’s non-adherence to aid conditionalities and non- 
interference is particularly problematic for good governance and the fight 
against corruption in Africa exemplified by its relationship with Angola 
and Sudan (Corkin, 2013). Commentators criticize Sinopec (China’s state- 
owned oil company) for colluding with Sonangol (Angola’s state-owned 
oil company) in opaque financial transactions and China’s ‘blind-eye’ 
support for the National Congress Party (NCP) of Sudan (el-Tigani, 2006) 
just to mention a few. These are argued to present significant challenges to 
good governance and the fight against corruption in Africa. 
Whereas I broadly agree that China's indifference to aid conditionalities 
may potentially impel good governance and the fight against corruption in 
Africa, it is exaggerated and, more importantly, China is non-ideological 
and pragmatic. I argue against such discourses suggesting that Chinese 
aid and development practices signify a radical paradigmatic shift 
from the prescriptive legacy of conditionality which has traditionally 
characterised the relationship between parties to such financing. I further 
argue that China offers countries opportunities for expanding domestic 
policy space enabling countries to choose from various macroeconomic 
and development policy options, to say the least. Or better yet, this may 
provide countries the space to develop their own national development 
strategies alternative to the policy prescriptions of the World Bank and 
the IMF. 
And —this is the interesting point however—that the Chinese principle 
thereby seeks to reinsert African agency and advances a Foucauldian 
governmentality conceptual framework for understanding agency both 
within and beyond the state. The claim I would like to advance here 
is that China is a partner rather a predator in the heart of Africa. Thus 
Ghana and Chinese areas of strength complement each other rather than 
the neoliberal model of development aid assistance. This view is mirrored 
by Ghana’s current president, Nana Akufo-Addo, who emphasises that 
Sino-Ghanaian relationship has been a creation of mutually beneficial 
partnership. For example, he said, “we want to build a value-added, 
industrialized economy with a modernized agriculture, which is neither 
victim nor pawn of the economic world order” (Taylor, 2017). President 
Akufo-Addo’s statement again highlights a dramatic shift in the spirit 
of aid relationships which enables mutual respect and manoeuvre in the 
world-economy, and not the continuation of an established core-periphery 
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relationship. As indicated previously, China takes a cautious approach 
of non-interference in the domestic politics of the recipient states before 
arriving at certain key issues in the existing aid models. The argument is 
that China breaks away from economic reforms prescribed by Western-led 
institutions notably the World Bank and the IMF in aid governance regime 
(Mohan, 2015). China’s development and economic cooperation strategies 
heavily rely on what I will describe as practical experience rather than 
the Western aid paradigm based purely on market forces and minimum 
state interference. My assertion is that China’s aid structure has led to the 
establishment of a new development framework of state’s engagement 
rather than the top-down analytic optic and the grossly essentialist view 
of the Africanist literatures (Hodzi, 2017). 
DISCIPLINARY POWER 
Here I discuss the concept of disciplinary power and its connection 
with Chinese deployment of disciplinary practices in the process of 
subjectivation in its development relations. Power relations is productive 
as much as it is constraining. The dynamics of Ghana-China engagement 
is not free from embedded conditionality. Inherent in Chinese aid and 
development practices is embedded conditionality which may be fraught 
with hidden strings. Chinese conditionality is not imposed as explicit policy 
conditions that require changes to national economic policies. China builds 
into its bilateral lending considerable use of Chinese inputs for example, 
the use of Chinese contractors and sub-contractors, labour etc. Structural 
conditioning effects of Chinese bilateral lending on recipient countries 
serves as disciplinary technology, and technique. Of course, China 
seriously adheres to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs 
of recipient countries and therefore respect their sovereignty, however, 
China looks after its own interests like any state. The pursuit of their own 
interests and strategies restrict or redirect national policy choices in the 
recipient country. In a broader sense, Chinese inputs and technocratic 
management imperceptibly discipline its recipients by ensuring that 
there are effective and legitimate state institutions for smooth running of 
modern business. In view of this, Chinese lenders utilise and re-inscribe 
disciplinary technologies and techniques via an interest in ensuring 
repayment of loans. One way to ensure repayment is by backing it with 
proceeds from the sale of the recipient country’s main export commodity. 
Disciplinary discursive practices and regulatory forms of power 
work to regulate the “conduct of conduct” through self-knowing and 
reasonable subjects (Springer, 2016). Actively reinstating states arising 
from self-regulatory principle through subjective freedom in discipline 
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manner (Dean, 1999) enhances and perpetuates the transplantation of 
development practices and discourses. This is true for Ghana -China 
relations to transform its environment by its own praxis. The concern here 
is not merely with the regulatory discipline but more crucially through 
the reproduction of omnipresence of a normalising model of development 
rationalities by the recipient countries (Ghanaian elites) within its own 
jurisdiction. Disciplinary technologies operate on a more routinised basis 
and function through control of particular spaces (Foucault, 2007). 
My argument, therefore, is that the production of Chinese development 
assistance and economic cooperation depend heavily on disciplinary 
approaches where countries have to demonstrate the institutional discipline 
and capacity necessary to utilise the resources to deliver development and 
economic growth. As such, they embody the tensions between disciplinary 
and governmental modes of development assistance and economic 
cooperation in Ghana. In so far as Beijing framework rehabilitates the 
regulatory capacity of the state, it also constrains the state by subjecting 
it to an internal process of accountability and external scrutiny through 
accountability mechanisms. Internal processes of accountability, greater 
external scrutiny and the institutional presence of the Chinese officials 
legitimise policy interventions. 
It is suggested that processes of accountability and greater external scrutiny 
powerfully reshape the modalities of Ghana’s engagement with China. 
The internalisation of policy by the political elites of aid-dependent states 
in all appearances, is exactly what the ontology of global governance, inter 
alia, takes its inspiration and insidiously aims to encourage. And of course, 
it is within this orientation that development governance thus very much 
appears to govern without government which informs governmentality 
rationalities. Foucault's explication on the importance of the “nornmalising 
judgement” in the function of normalising power does not entail the use 
of coercion, but through the construction of normalised subjects. Against 
these views, however, the chapter has argued that the dynamics of Ghana- 
China interactions over the years has been one of equal partners. China’s 
assistance is more of a development cooperation increasingly driven by 
political economy and diplomatic relationships, to be sure. Ghanaian elites 
willingly cooperate with Chinese counterparts; that is not following the 
neoliberal prescriptions of the international financial institutions notably 
the World Bank and the IMF. Indeed it may be argued that China-Ghana 
interaction is not that of a patient and doctor relation, it must rather be 
seen as strategic partners in pursuit of a common goal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Using Ghana, this chapter has argued that Ghanaian elites despite 
negotiating in variegated cleavages of asymmetrical relations, are not 
passive, conforming and weak agents in the framework of infrastructure 
projects negotiation. The case study of the agency exhibited by Ghanaian 
elites in conventional asymmetrical relations peddled in IR demonstrate 
their influence in negotiation as modes of resistance with China (Mohan, 
2015). The chapter showed that China vis-a-vis the industrialised countries, 
political elites in Ghana and Africa broadly have capacity for critical agency 
and there is enormous room for manoeuvre in domestic policies (Chapaike 
& Henri Bischoff, 2018). This line of thinking presents African governing 
elites as having minimum input and policy autonomy. For me, the deepest 
problem with this common view is that it is one-sided and naively presents 
a limited account of African experiences and realities which run much 
deeper than what the prevailing epistemological posture would make 
us believe. Such assertions seem oddly unaware of the contradictory and 
complex processes of mutual constitution of the making and breaking of 
boundaries, evinced in the contested flows and counter flows of practices, 
rationalities and discourses — derived from various spatial and temporal 
configurations — which specify the productivity of power as distinct 
from techniques of domination. While predominant narrative asserts that 
the Chinese model of aid and development practice create new forms of 
dependency and a debt trap in order to have its way with weak victims, I 
take a different perspective (Brautigam, 2019). 
I have conceptualised Ghana-China bilateral relations not as a zero- 
sum game, but rather a win-win game. What I wish to emphasise here 
is that governmental logic more plausibly outlines that the Chinese 
government governs through “freedom” and disciplinary normalisation, 
producing self-governing aid-dependent political subjects who needed to 
conform to the imperatives and technologies of government. Conceived 
in this way, Ghana-China intense interactions create normalising field of 
interventions in the name of ‘development’ assistance, which comprises 
both governmentality and discipline. Ghana-China engagement turns on 
the application of Foucauldian analysis with regards to disciplinary power 
of Chinese aid and development practices. As far as I can see, the extent 
to which pervasive discourses can subjugate actors — whether states or 
individuals —and render them susceptible to the effects of power is by itself 
contingent on how they (elites) envision alternative discursive practices 
from “others” worldview or discursively resist them. It is the contention 
of this chapter that the pervasive aid and development practices more 
generally, must be examined and analysed within a broader discursive 
space — only then does it make sense to speak of critical space of contested, 
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restricted and often multiple confrontations. Upon sober reflection and 
after taking into account such empirical developments, it might be said 
that Ghana-China relations is more plausibly a terrain of agency than it is 
of domination and imposition. 
Reflecting on the particular illustrative example of Ghana-China bilateral 
relations, I elucidated the ways political technology of development 
assistance emerges most pre-eminently as a mode or technique of 
governmentality. A Foucauldian lens of analysis established that 
development assistance in the context of Ghana-China interactions 
procreate and enable governable subjects and effective modes of 
behaviour and deploy technologies and techniques to produce the desired 
governmental objectives— forming discursive nodes and modes to firmly 
entrench, maintain and reinforce policy interventions. I have argued here 
that heavily enmeshed in development discourses of China are diverse 
combinations and productions of policy techniques not imposed which 
reflect a rationality of governing. It is worth some pause to reflect this idea 
that in considering the specific case of China-Ghana bilateral relations, 
the governmentality rationality is better at explaining practices, specific 
techniques and technologies of power framed through the notion of 
normalisation that underlie dominant forms of contemporary development 
governance. 
I have offered a different perspective that challenges the predominant 
literature on China-Africa relations in general and Ghana-China 
relation specifically. Reading Foucault from Ghana-China relations, it 
strikes me that this line of thinking is more tenable and perhaps opens 
up new analytical possibilities and critical tools we can develop to re- 
conceptualise and offer fresh perspectives to undress or critique aid and 
development practices. Studying Ghana-China relations through the lens 
of governmentality analytic enables us to study how dynamics of power 
relations are defined by certain practices and techniques, and how such 
rationalities produce specific types of capable and free agents. In as muchas 
Ghana cannot be adequately representative of the whole African continent; 
it is my contention that it provides some nuanced understanding of how 
African agency has been exerted by African states in their increasing 
engagements with China in the context of development assistance and 
economic cooperation. Importantly, the two cases discussed offer a critical 
entry point to understand the broader implications on contemporary 
Sino-African engagement and how Ghana-China interactions specifically 
suggests a new direction toward development assistance and economic 
cooperation. 
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